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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELL{\NCE NATIONAL LIFE \ 
IXSl~ltANCE COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff and ..~1 ppellant, 
l Case No. 
vs. 10,003 
\Y"ILLIAM P. HANSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff, Reliance National 
Life Insurance Company, for the recision of a written 
contract of employment, between plaintiff and defend-
ant, ''rilliam P. Hansen. The plaintiff claims that 
certain fraudulent statements made by defendant dur-
ing the preliminary negotiations induced plaintiff to 
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enter into the employment contract, and that at the 
time tli~ .tst~t~mepts_ ;were made by defendant, he knew 
them to be false and misleading. Plaintiff further 
claims that after the contract· had been signed by both 
parties, the defen<;lant conducted himself in such a 
manner that there were reasonable grounds to terminate 
the contract for cause. 
As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff contends all 
monies paid to the defendant under the contract and 
all expenses inc~tred by virtue of ·hi~· employment should 
. . - . : - .. ' . ~ 
be returned, an.d that defendant have no rights by reason 
thereof. , · 
~ :< -Defendant counterclaimed ·and alleged that there 
are certain monies due him by virtue of the con~ra~t of 
employment, as well as commissions- e~rned after the 
contract had been terminated. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
-. 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment 
for defendant of "no cause of action on plaintiff's com-
plaint," and an award of $3,500.00 on two separate 
counts of the defendant's counterclaim, plaintiff ap-
peal~ .. The first :Pal-t o( the coluitercl~im' inVolves the 
. severing of that portion of the contract dealing with 
the-airplane·from the- contract as a whole; the second, 
commissions ·earned; after- the contract was terminated. 
·The judgment further -provides thaf the- defendant's 
contract of- employment was "terminated -for cause" 
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und ,therefore, defendant \vas not entitled to receive any 
n1onies that accrued in the for1n of bonuses or override 
l'onunissions. 'fhe plaintiff appeals upon the grounds 
th:tt the judgtneut of the court is not supported hy the 
Findings of Fact. 
l{ELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Plaintifl' seeks reversal from that portion of the 
L<l\rer C'ourt's judgment \vhich finds that the defendant 
rnay recover the unpaid balance ($2,500.00) due on the 
airplane. The plaintiff also seeks reversal from that 
portion of the Lower Court's judgment which finds 
that the defendant is entitled to recover certain com-
Inissions claimed to have been earned after the employ-
ment contract 'vas terminated. The plaintiff further 
seeks recovery of all monies paid under the contract, 
as \veil as the expenses incurred in the maintenance of 
the airplane referred to above, along with all payments 
1nade "·bile the airplane was in the possession of the 
plaintiff, plaintiff having assumed the original purchase 
contract. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is a corporation organized on J anu-
ary :?6, 195~, for the purpose of selling life insurance. 
Frank B. Salisbury helped organize the company, and 
since its incorporation has actively managed the com-
pany as its president. (R. 59, 60). In June of 1961, 
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•'·""' . 
o 1)1 •, 
- .... ,. 
Salisbury saw an advertisement in a bulletin called 
"The Western Underwriter" outlining the qualifica-
tions of the defendant, Mr. Hansen. (R. 61). After the 
original contact between Salisbury and Mr. Hansen, 
negotiations were entered into, and preliminary to the 
signing of the employment contract, ( P. Exh. 1), Mr. 
Hansen made the following representations which were 
f~lse, and known. to be ~alse, at the time made: 
(a) Defendant had a presently exis'ting sales 
organization which defendant would bring 
with him to Plaintiff company. (R. 63). 
(b) Defendant had developed a way of selling 
mutual funds and insurance policies in a 
package and that this program had been 
approved by the insurance commissioner of 
Utah and the S.E.C. (R. 63, 64, 65). 
(c) Defendant had developed sales material to 
be used by insurance ·salesmen in selling a 
package consisting of mutual funds and in-
surance policies, and this sales material had 
been approved by the insurance commis-
sioner. (R. 75, 104) (P. Exh. 23). 
(d) Defendant had successfully field tested this 
program~ ( R. 64) . 
Also, during p~reliminary talks the defendant rep-
resented that an airplane he owned was necessary for 
the success of the sales program. ( R. 233) . As a result, 
plain~iff agreed 'to accept an assignment .of defendant's 
equity in the airplane for a total consideration of 
$4,000.00. One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,-
500.00) of this a1nount was paid defendant on the day 
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the en1ployn1ent contract was signed, the balance was 
due on or before J nnuary 20, 1962. This was made a 
part of the contract of employment. ( P. Exh. 1). 
!Juring the first part of September, plaintiff acted 
to ter1nina te the contract. ( R. 80) . After notice of ter-
tnination the defendant was offered the airplane if he 
\rould repay the initial $1,500.00, which he refused. 
(It :!:J:!). The refusal was due to his financial condi-
tion at the time. (R. 242). 
During the period plaintiff had possession of the 
airplane\ it paid out a total of $8,559.08. (R. 133). This 
figure includes monthly payments, insurance, mainten-
ance\ fuel, etc. ( R. 133). The airplane was sold April 
1~\ 1962. 
Prior to the termination of the employment con-
tract, plaintiff paid to defendant $3,7 50.00 in salary; 
ho,vever, there were no bonuses paid. (R. 186) . 
.l\.fter termination the defendant continued with 
the company for a short period on a commission basis. 
During this period defendant claims to have earned 
~1,000.00 in commissions. (R. 245}. The plaintiff con-
tends if anything is due, it does not exceed $45.00. (R. 
30, 31, 32, P. Ex ..... ). 
Plaintiff presented evidence which shows it was 
dan1uged in the sum of $20,107.30 because of defend-
ant's false statements. (R. 133}. The breakdown is as 
folJo,vs: 
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Airplane $8,559.08 (R. 133) 
Commissions, etc. 4,497.22 ( R. 133) 
New Sales Program, etc._ 3,301.00 (R. 133) 
Salary paid defendant 3,750.00 (R. 186) 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW 
WHEREIN IT FOUND "NO· CAUSE OF AC-
TION" ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND 
YET FOUND AS A FACT THAT THE DE-
FENDANT WAS GUILTY OF FALSE AND 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS IN 
THE NEGOTIATIONS PRELIMINARY TO 
THE SIGNING OF THE EMPLOYMEN'l' 
CONTRACT ARE ERRONEOUS. 
The Findings of Fact as accepted by the court are 
not disputed by the defendant in that no cross appeal 
was filed. ·The~ pertinent provisions are : 
. "1. _Plaintiff is a corp,oration .organi~ed and existing 
pur~uant. to the laws of the State of Utah, and is duly 
authorized to engage in the insurance business in the 
State of Utah. 
2. Frank B. Salisbury is the President of Plaintiff 
corporation. 
3. Defendant is an experienced insurance salesman 
and has served in administrative capacities with various 
insurance companies in the State of Utah. 
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4. 'l'he defendant inserted a notice in an insurance 
journal to the effect that he \vas seeking employment 
with an insurance cotnpauy. Pursuant to this notice, 
deft.:ndant \vas personally interviewed by Frank B. 
Salisbury concerning the possibility of defendant being 
trnployed by plaintiff. Salisbury made no search of 
det'endan t · s past record. 
5. The defendant made the following representa-
tions uf fact to Frank B. Salisbury for the purpose of 
indnciny plaintiff to e1~ter into an employment contract 
1cith the defendant: 
a. Defendant had a presently existing sales or-
ganization which defendant would bring with 
him to Plaintiff company. 
b. Defendant had developed a way of selling 
mutual funds and insurance policies in a pack-
age and that this program had been approved 
by the insurance commissioner. 
c. Defendant had developed sales material to be 
used by insurance salesmen in selling a pack-
age consisting of mutual funds and insurance 
policies, and this sales material had been ap-
proved by the insurance commissioner. 
d. Defendant had successfully field tested this 
program. 
6. The statements made by defendant to plaintiff'_, 
as set forth under Finding of Fact }.r o. 5, were false and 
u:ere kno~·n by defendant to be false at the time they 
'ii.'ere made. 
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7. Plaintiff would 1~ot have entered into any con-
tract with defendant had it not been for the false state-
ments by defendant to plaintiff~ as set forth in Finding 
of Fact No. 5. 
8. In reliance on the state11tents made by defendant 
to plaintiff~ as set forth in Finding of Fact No.5~ plain-
tiff entered into a writte'n contract with defendant which 
was received in eviden~ce as Pretrial Exhibit I, pursuant 
to which plaintiff agreed as follows: 
a. To assume the purchase contract of a certain 
airplane being purchased by defendant and to 
pay defendant the sum of $4,000.00 for de-
fenda~t~s equity in the same. 
b. To pay defendant a bopus in an amount equal 
to 1% of all first year premiums on life insur-
ance business collected by plaintiff during the 
defendant's employment with plaintiff. 
c. To pay defendant a salary of $1,500.00 per 
month. 
d. To pay defendant a bonus based on the differ-
ence between the cost of acquiring new busi-
ness and 100% of the amount of premium re-
ceived of new business. 
9. The contract of employment between plaintiff 
and defendant~ as set forth in Finding of Fact No. 8, 
was terminated by plaintiff for ca1tse due to the follow-
ing acts of the defendant: 
a. The defendant was directed to sell the afore-
said airplane and made no effort to do so. 
b. The defendant was instructed not to approach 
the insurance department of the State of Idaho 
10 
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in regard to the Estate Accumulator Policy. 
~ evertheless, the defendant did consult with 
that department 'vith negative results to the 
prejudice of plaintiff. 
c. Defendant was instructed not to sell a partici-
pating policy which was being designed by 
plaintiff until the policy had been approved by 
plaintiff's actuary. Nevertheless, defendant 
proceeded to sell this policy before approval 
from the actuary was obtained. 
d. Defendant was instructed not to contact any 
insurance department regarding approval of 
the Estate Accumulator policy, but to leave 
this matter in the hands of the actuary for 
plaintiff. Nevertheless, defendant wrote the 
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Wash-
ington regarding approval of this policy with 
adverse results to plaintiff. 
e. Defendant was instructed not to use the com· 
pany airplane for personal business, but never· 
theless did use the airplane for personal busi-
ness. 
10. The agreement of plaintiff to purchMe the 
rquity of defendant in the aforesaid airplane WM a sepa-
rate agreement divisible from the employment contract 
and the terms thereof. 
II. Plaintiff did not learn of the falsity of defend-
ant's statements, as set forth in Finding of Fact No. 5, 
until n1ore than three months after plaintiff and defend-
ant entered into the aforesaid employment contract. 
I2. Plaintiff hM paid the sum of $8,268.40 on the 
purchase contract of the said airplane and for the up-
11 
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1-ceep thereof., but plaintiff has not paid defendant the 
sum of $2,500.00 which plaintiff agreed to pay defend-
ant under the terms of the aforesaid employment con-
tract. 
13. At the time plaintiff terminated the said em-
ployment contract~ plaintiff requested defendant to 
take possession of the said airpla1~e and assume the bur-
den of completing the purchase contract payments. 
14. Plaintiff paid the defendant the sum of $3,-
750.00 as salary under the terms of said employment 
contract. 
15. Subsequent to the time plaintiff terminated the 
said employment contract, defendant sold certain in-
surance policies for plaintiff, and there is now due the 
defendant, as commissions on such sales, the sum of 
$1,000.00. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, 
now makes the following conclusions of law: 
1. Defendant is not entitled to any compensation 
by reason of the employment contract entered 
into between plaintiff and defendant. 
2. The agreement of plaintiff to purchase the 
equity of defendant in the aforesaid airplane 
was a separate agreement, divisible from the 
employment contract, the defendant is en-
titled to judgment against plaintiff in the sum 
of $2,500.00, being the amount plaintiff agreed 
to pay defendant for defendant's said equity. 
3. Defendant is entitled to judgment against the 
plaintiff in the amount of $1,000.00 being the 
amount owed by plaintiff to defendant for in-
12 
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surance com1nissions earned by defendant sub-
sequent to the termination of the aforesaid 
employn1ent contract''. (Emphasis added). 
1\ ton tract induced by fraud is voidable at the 
option of the party injured by the fraud, and the de-
frauded party may elect to rescind the contract upon 
its discovery; however, he must act with reasonable 
prornptness, 12 A1n. Jnr. 638, 639; 2~ Am Jur. 12; Tay-
lor 'l's. 1lloorc, ct al., 51 P.2d 222, 87 Utah 493; Shap-
pirio t's. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232; 24 S.Ct. 259; Levine 
t'f al. 'lW. Whitehoza~e ct al.~ 109 P.2, 37 Utah 260. 
''rhere a party sues for the recision of a "\vritten 
contract, the purpose of the proceedings is to restore 
the defrauded party to the position he was in prior to 
the execution of the instrument induced by the fraud 
of the other contracting party. Where there has been 
a serious and intentional atten1pt to deceive, the party 
upon 'vhom the fraud has been imposed must, upon its 
discovery, act. In the case of S kola vs. Merrill~ et al. ~ 
64 P.2d 185, 91 Utah 253, this court impressed this re-
quirement upon the law of this state. 
In the case presently before this Honorable Court, 
:\Ir. Salisbury, acting as president of the plaintiff, noti-
fied the defendant of the termination of the agreement, 
and tendered back the airplane within a matter of days 
after it "·as discovered that the representations made 
by the defendant were false. 
The restoration of the status quo in a proper case 
of recision is a two-edged sword. The courts have held 
that it is necessary that both parties be returned to the 
13 
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position that existed prior to the contract. The party 
rescinding must tender back that which he received. 
Thus, when the person defrauded has been induced 
into making expenditures as a result of misrepresenta-
tion, provided they were reasonable, these are recover-
able, insofar as they have been rendered fruitless because 
of the deceit. McCormick on Damages~ Ch. 18, § 122, 
p. 458. 
In recision the plaintiff's expenditures are naturally 
recoverable, with due accounting for benefits. Johnson 
vs. Gilbert~ 382 P.2d 87. ---·---- Ore ..... ; Strand Bldg. 
Corp vs. Russell & Saxe~ Inc.~ 232 N.Y. 2d 384; First 
National Bank of West Plains vs. King~ 363 S.W. 2d 
590, ____ ; Erisman vs. Overman~ 358 P.2d 85, II P.2d 
258. 
The Erisman case, above cited, supports the gene-
ral principles of law in matters of recision. The party 
rescinding must tender back everything received before 
the court restores the status quo between the parties. 
The corollary of this rule is also accepted, that where 
there is fraud involved, and a timely tender made, the 
defrauded party has the right to receive back what has 
been paid or given or assumed under a contract. 
POINT II 
THE COURT REACHED ERRONEOUS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FACTS 
FOUND WHEREIN IT AWARDED JUDG-
MENT FOR THE DEFENDANT BASED UP-
14 
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()X 'rilE S~~\~Elt.(\IJILI'I'Y OF 'fHAT POR-
1,1(>~ ()~, TII.E C'.ON'rlt1\CT DEALING \\riTI-1 
'filE "\lllPLANE. 
In considering the question of fraud and misrep-
resl'ntalion the party seeking relief must allege and 
proYe what representations were made, that they were 
fnlse and known to be so by the party charged, and 
that the party seeking relief believed the rep res entation 
to be true and that he acted upon them and was injured 
thereby. 
In light of the foregoing, it must be said, based 
upon the findings of the court, that this was accom-
plished,and, therefore, the judgment finding severable 
that portion of the contract dealing with the airplane 
is erroneous. All of the evidence points to the fact that 
the airplane was represented to be essential to success 
of the total program that defendant outlined to Salis-
bury. The record is as fallows : 
)lr. Barker 
"Q. Do you recall any other statements which 
he made to you? 
)lr. Salisbury 
"A. He stated that in order put forth this pro-
gram, to put forth this program, to put it into 
effect and contact these salesmen throughout the 
state, that he had to have the Mooney airplane 
that he had at the time, and in order to put this 
program into effect it would be necessary for our 
company to assume the obligation that he had 
on this Mooney airplane so that he could fly it 
throughout the various places in the state and con-
IS 
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tact these men that he had that would come with 
us. 
"Q. Did he make any statements as to the use 
he had previously made of this airplane? 
"A. He said that it had proven very valuable 
to him, and anytime I wasn't convinced that it 
was a profitable venture to have an airplane, 
that he could get rid of it at any time without 
loss to us. That is to the company . 
• * * * 
Mr. Barker 
"Q. I will get into specifics. As far as this 
airplane is concerned, did he not resist the inclu-
sion of this airplane in the contract, in this con-
tract all the way? 
Mr. Hansen 
"A. He did resist the inclusion of the airplane. 
"Q. In the representations that were made on 
the airplane, did you not tell him that you had 
used this airplane extensively in the program 
that you had field tested? 
"A. I told him that we had used it to our ad-
vantage. 
"Q. And that if the present program that you 
were presenting to him for his acceptance was 
to be successful that you had to have that air-
plane? 
''A. There wasn't any hinge on the success of 
the program at all. The idea was that the airplane 
would facilitate matters, moving through the 11-
state area that Reliance was in at that time much 
more rapidly and an easier problem than if I 
were to go to commercial airlines, and that was 
the only commitment, for that statement. 
16 
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"Q. 1\nd did you not tell hitn that in your 
experience \vith airplanes and this particular 
type of airplane, that the airplane could readily 
be disposed of "·ithout loss? 
".t\. I never said anything like 'without loss,' 
be<'ause naturally there is natural depreciation. 
uQ. \ \rithout loss other than depreciation? 
~'..t\. 1"'his would be the normal. 'We can al,vays 
sell it,' were my terms as I recall it, and that 
was all." 
'fhe airplane was therefore made an integral part 
of the tnisrepresented facts, and it is evident that the 
plaintiff would not have assumed the defendant's equity 
in the airplane but for his grossly false statements. 
\ \rhere a contract involves several parts, yet make 
up one transaction, fraud in one part vitiates the entire 
agreement. !'leredith vs. Ramsdell~ 384 P.2d 941, ___ _ 
Colo. 2d ....• 
To the same effect is the case of .Anson vs. Grace~ 
117 X.l\r. 2d 117 N.W.2d 529, 174 Neb. 2d 258. 
'fherefore, the court erred in granting the defend-
ant the sum of $2,500.00 as the unpaid portion of the 
price of defendant's equity in the airplane. 
POINT III 
A JUDGl\IENT ~lAY NOT BE BASED 
lTPOX ~IERE CONJECTURE, Sl_~R)IISE OR 
SPECUL ... ~TION, AND THE COURT THUS 
17 
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ERRED WHEREIN IT AWARDED A JUDG-
MENT FOR DEFENDANT FOR THE COM-
MISSIONS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN 
EARNED AFTER THE TERMINATION OF 
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. 
The burden of proof requires the party carrying 
it to prove to the court the fact upon which his case 
depends, by a preponderance of greater weight of the 
credible evidence. To create a preponderance of evi-
dence, the evidence must be sufficient to overcome the 
opposing proposition as well as the opposing evidence. 
The trier of a case, when doubts arise concerning the 
weight of the evidence, must find for the side whereon 
the doubts have less weight. 
The only evidence offered by the defendant con-
cerning the claimed commissions was his statement found 
on page 245 of the record, which is as follows: 
"Q. By Mr. Tuft) As to commissions, Mr. 
Hansen, did you keep track of the commissions 
due you? 
"A. I had no way because the company was 
keeping up most of those, but I do have track of 
the contracts and can calculate them, and that 
should be, in round figures, approximately 
$1,000.00. 
"Q. To the best of your belief, $1,000.00? 
"A. Yes." 
His excuse for not having more was, that all of the 
records concerning the sales and payments made there-
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under 'verc in the possession and control of the plain-
titl'. 'fhe plaintiff introduced all of its records. (See 
Ex h ..... ) . 'fhere is contained in the record a sutnmary 
of' these records and it is found on pages 31 and 32. 
1\eeording to the corporation records, which are by far 
the Lest c\·idence, there is due to Mr. Hansen the amount 
of· $43.ti~. 
A verdict may not lawfully be predicated upon 
n1cre conjecture or speculation, and in this case that is 
the only \ray the court could arrive at its conclusion. 
The defendant, having the burden of proof insofar 
us the claimed commissions are concerned, was obli-
gated to establish the fact alleged by evidence at least 
sufficient to destroy the validity of the corporate rec-
ords. Can it be said that an estimate is sufficient to do 
this~ The defendant did not, at any time, question the 
completeness of the corporate records, nor did he pro-
duce any records of his own to show that the records 
\vere not accurate. 
Therefore, it would appear that there is no real 
evidence in the record upon which the court could justly 
find in favor of the defendant. From the evidence 
adduced at the trial the court erred in granting a judg-
nlent for the defendant for the sum of $1,000.00, when 
in fact, there was only $43.62 due. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should set aside the determination of the 
Lower Court that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed 
"no cause of action" and award to the plaintiff the 
damages proved by a preponderance of the evidence, 
in the amount of $20,107.30, because of the proven fact 
of fraud in the inducement of the employment contract. 
The court should also find that since the award to the 
defendant of $2,500.00 was based upon the severability 
of that portion of the contract dealing with the airplane, 
from the contract as a whole, was wrong. The court 
should further find that if there is any amount due and 
owing to the defendant, that that sum does not exceed 
$43.62 and that amount may be offset against the 
$20,107.30, which the plaintiff has proven. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BARKER & RYBERG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
68 East 21st South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TUFT & McRAE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
53 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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